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THE PROBLEM OF THE INDETERMINATE DEFENDANT 




 The article discusses the problem of the indeterminate defendant in European tort law systems 
and in the projects aiming to unify tort law in Europe, such as Draft Common Frame of Reference 
and Principles of European Tort Law.  
 The given issue relates to a situation where there is a damage caused by one factor, yet upon 
available evidence one may indicate a few potential factors which might have led to the damage, 
but it cannot be ascertained which factor was the actual cause of it. The problem is addressed with 
reference to two scenarios. First, when there is a limited and known number of persons acting 
tortiously, each of whom potentially might have led to the damage, but only one of them had 
actually caused it. Second, when it is certain that one tortfeasor from the undetermined group  
of tortfeasors caused damage to some of the injured persons from the group of the injured persons, 
but it cannot be established precisely which tortfeasor caused damage to precisely which injured 
person.  
 In comparative law analysis, one may find various attempts to deal with the given issue, which 
come from the balance of ratios given to different solutions, as well as the legal possibilities  
or obstacles in national tort law systems. The main possibilities are: all-or-nothing approach, joint 
and several liability, and proportional liability. Those solutions are discussed in article in more 
detail with conclusion that the bold proposition of proportional liability presented in Principles  
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Abstract
This paper focuses on the opinions of constitutional courts in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, United States of America, Canada, the Czech Republic, and the Constitutional 
Tribunal in Poland on taking references samples for DNA tests from a suspect (an 
accused). The inconsistency of Polish regulations referri g to the DNA analysis is the 
main object of criticism. 
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“The value of DNA evidence in a criminal investigation may seem as obvious 
as the value of a parachute when jumping out of an airplane”. 
David B. Wilson, David McClure, David Weisburd1
In 1993 four German right-wing extremists set fire to a house in Solingen, 
in which five members of a Turkish family died. In May 1995, the
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 Düsseldorf Regional Court received an anonymous letter with a forged 
notarial document denouncing a Turkish citizen living in Berlin (with 
whom a Detlef-Harro Schmidt had a legal dispute) as the perpetrator 
of the Solingen crime. In order to determine the sender of the letter 
the saliva on the stamp was investigated. In 1995 the Tiergarten 
District Court ordered, in accordance with § 81a of the German Code 
of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung, StPO) the taking and 
examination a sample of blood and saliva of Detlef-Harro Schmidt. 
He was subsequently convicted in 1996 for casting false suspicion on 
a third person, forgery, and defamation and was sentenced to two and 
a half years’ imprisonment. On 23 October 2001, the Berlin Regional 
Court dismissed Schmidt’s appeal against the Tiergarten District Court’s 
order to take the blood and saliva sample. On 7 March 2002, the Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) refused to admit 
Schmidt’s constitutional complaint since the order to take the blood and 
saliva had been proportionate. The European Court of Human Rights in 
its decision of 5 January 2006 unanimously also rejected the applicant’s 
complaint. The Court confirmed that taking reference samples such 
as blood and saliva must be considered as interference in the right to 
privacy under Article 8 of the Convention unless it was compliant with 
Section Two of that Article.
The Court noted that the interference was based on §81a of the 
German Code of Criminal Procedure and was compliant with it. The 
applicant did not state that the samples had been taken in a manner 
contrary to the Code of Criminal Procedure; moreover, his blood and 
saliva samples were necessary to determine his authorship of the letter2. 
***
The German Code of Criminal Procedure describes genetic examinations 
in §§ 81e-81h. According to § 81a, a body sample may be taken from the 
accused (Beschuldigte) also without his/her consent. The authority to give 
such order shall be vested in the judge, and if delay was to endanger the
Benefit of Sophisticated Answers to Naïve Questions, „Journal of Contemporary Criminal 
Justice” 2010, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 459.
2 ECtHR, Schmidt v. Germany, Application no. 32352/02, Judgment of 05.01.2006, 
available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng [last accessed 07.01.2017].
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 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
ay have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicted ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
208
success of the examination, also in the public prosecution office. Blood 
samples or other body cells taken from the accused may be used only 
for the purposes of the criminal procedure, and they shall be destroyed 
without delay as soon as they are no longer required for such purposes. 
If the accused person is suspected of a criminal offence of substantial 
significance, or of a crime against sexual self-determination, then, for 
the purposes of establishing identity in future criminal proceedings, cell 
tissue may be collected from that person and subjected to molecular and 
genetic examination in order to establish the DNA profile or the gender 
if the nature of the offence or the way it was committed, the personality 
of the accused, or other information provide grounds for assuming that 
criminal proceedings will be conducted against the accused person in the 
future with respect to a criminal offence of substantial significance. If the 
person concerned habitually commits other criminal offences, this may be 
deemed to be equivalent to a criminal offence of substantial significance 
by reference to the level of injustice done (§ 81g item 1).
The evident ambiguity of the German Code of Criminal Procedure 
has had to be cleared up by the Federal Constitutional Court, which had 
already passed some judgments in the field3. One of the most recent and 
most important is the judgment of 29 September 2013, 2 BvR 939/134. 
In this case the applicant, convicted of the handling of stolen goods 
and sentenced to one year and five months of prison with probation, 
claimed the violation of his right to informational self-determination 
pursuant to Article 2.1 in conjunction with Article 1.1. of the Constitution 
by the Hamburg courts’ orders to take his DNA samples. The Federal 
Constitutional Court accepted the constitutional complaint. The Court 
stated that the establishment, storage and future use of a DNA profile 
interferes with the fundamental right to informational self-determination 
guaranteed by the German Constitution. This guarantee may only 
be limited in the overriding interest of the public, provided that the 
limitation complies with the principle of proportionality, and may 
not be wider than is absolutely necessary in order to protect public 
interests. When interpreting and applying § 81g StPO, the court must 
3 See for instance supra note 2.
4 http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung... [last 
accessed 02.01.2017].
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adequately consider the meaning and scope of this fundamental right. 
As concerns the prognosis of future criminal behaviour, it is necessary to 
give affirmative reasons that relate to the specific case at hand; the mere 
repetition of the legal text is not sufficient. The challenged decisions of 
the courts did not meet these constitutional requirements because the 
courts did not include all relevant circumstances or did not evaluate 
them sufficiently. 
***
In trials in the USA, taking reference samples from the arrested, 
accused, or convicted persons should be considered in the context of 
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, which reads: „The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized”5. Thus the pivotal problem is the 
meaning and connotation of the term “search”, which can refer to both 
a personal search and to an inspection. The doctrine of the American 
trial is dominated by a view that collecting buccal swab samples (inside 
a person’s cheek) is the search referred to in the Fourth Amendment 
with all its relevant requirements6. However, only as late as in 2013, the 
Supreme Court of the United States dispelled all the doubts by giving 
a verdict by 5 votes to 4 in Maryland v. King 7. 
The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the constitutionality of the 
Maryland DNA Collection Act, which allows the taking of buccal swab 
samples from arrestees: „When officers make an arrest supported by 
probable cause to hold for a serious offense and bring the suspect to 
the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek 
5 D. H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, „Cornell Journal of 
Law and Public Policy” 2001, Vol. 10, Issue 3, Article 2, p. 472.
6 Ibidem, pp. 480-481. 
7 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/12-207 [last accessed 05.01.2017]; 
J. Wójcikiewicz, „Genetyczny panoptykon” czy oczywista konieczność? Wyrok Sądu Najwyższego 
Stanów Zjednoczonych w sprawie Maryland v. King (2013) [„Genetic panopticon” or evident 
necessity? The US Supreme Court’s judgment in Maryland v. King (2013)], „Przegląd Sądowy” 
2013, No. 11-12, pp. 17-25.
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swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, 
a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment”. The court was also of the opinion that using the 
buccal swab sample inside a person’s cheek to obtain a DNA sample 
is a search, but the intrusion is negligible and minimal. That fact is of 
central relevance to determining whether the search is reasonable, and 
the government interest must outweigh the degree to which the search 
invades an individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy.
The majority regarded taking DNA samples as a means of establishing 
the identity of the arrestee. The dissenting minority by Justice Scalia 
wrote that “The Court’s assertion that DNA is being taken, not to solve 
crimes, but to identify those in the State’s custody, taxes the credulity 
of the credulous (…). Solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but 
it occupies a lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives 
than the protection of our people from suspicionless law-enforcement 
searches”. Justice Scalia expressed his hope that such an incursion upon 
the Fourth Amendment would someday be repudiated. 
However, Maryland’s DNA law is not unique: as of June 2012 twenty-
eight states and the federal government had adopted laws similar to 
Maryland’s, thus authorizing the collection of DNA samples from some 
or all arrestees8.
***
The Canadian Supreme Court took a similar stance. As regards the 
constitutionality of taking DNA reference samples, the Supreme Court 
declared its opinion specifically in two verdicts: R. v. S.A.B. (2003)9 and 
R. v. Saeed (2016)10.
The first case concerned sexual relations with a 14-year-old girl, and 
DNA testing was based on comparing the DNA of the post-abortion fetus 
and the DNA of the accused. He claimed that Sections 487.05 to 487.09 
8 DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, National Institute of Justice, http://
www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/pages/collection-from-arrestees.aspx [last 
accessed 06.11.2017].
9 https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2094/index.do [last accessed 
22.05.2017].
10 https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-cse/en/item/16023/index.do [last accessed 
22.05.2017].
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of the Criminal Code that regulate collecting obtaining DNA reference 
samples were not compliant with Sections 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms11. Section 7 stipulates that “Everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice”12, and Section 8 says that “Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure”13. 
The Supreme Court in the verdict authored by Judge Arbour decided 
that Sections 487.05 do 487.09 of the Criminal Code do not infringe Section 
7 or Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Ali Hassan Saeed’s case started around 4 a.m., 22 May, 2011, when 
the victim was sexually assaulted. Saeed was arrested on suspicion of 
sexual assault at 6.05. However, he was soon released by mistake and 
detained again at 8.35 a.m. While relying on the testimony of the victim, 
police officers hoped to find the victim’s DNA on Saeed’s penis. A penis 
swab could not be collected immediately, and police officers placed the 
handcuffed arrestee in a prison cell without any access to water and 
toilet. The swab was taken at 10:45. The police allowed the arrestee to 
take it himself. The evidence showed the presence of the victim’s DNA 
on Saeed’s penis. Judge of the first instance court ruled that although the 
swab sampling was contrary to Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, yet she allowed the DNA analysis evidence following Section 
24 (2): „Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes 
that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any 
rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be 
excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, 
the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute”14. The Court of Appeal shared this view. The 
Supreme Court stated that “the accused was validly arrested. The swab 
was performed to preserve evidence of the sexual assault. The police had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the complaint’s DNA had transferred 
11 Constitution Act, 1982, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-15.html 
[last accessed 22.05.2017].
12 Ibidem, p. 3.
13 Ibidem. 
14 Ibidem, p. 7. 
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to the accused penis during the assault and that it would still be found on 
his penis. The swab was performed in a reasonable manner. The police 
officers were sensitive to the need to preserve the accused’s privacy 
and dignity. The accused was informed in advance of the procedure for 
taking the swab and its purpose. The swab itself was conducted quickly, 
smoothly, and privately. The swab took at most two minutes. The accused 
took the swab himself. There was no physical contact between the officers 
and the accused. The officers took detailed notes regarding the reasons for 
the process of taking the swab. The swab did not fundamentally violate 
the accused’s human dignity”15. 
In consequence, the Court held that the rights of the accused granted 
by Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms were not breached 
and the evidence of the complaint’s DNA obtained from the swabbing 
was properly admitted.
***
The Czech Constitutional Court has on several occasions commented on 
obtaining reference samples from an accused. In the judgments of I. ÚS 
671/05 of 22 February 2006 and III. ÚS 655/06 of 23 May 2007, the Court 
found it unacceptable to impose a penalty for default to make the accused 
give a sample of a scent, hair or smear from the mucosa inside the cheek. 
To this last judgment, issued in a panel of three judges, a dissenting 
opinion was annexed by Jan Musil16. His views were shared three years 
later by the Court sitting in plenary session, on 30 November 2010 that 
issued resolution Pl. ÚS-st 30/1017 stating that the actions referred to in 
§114 of Law No 141/1961 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (trestní řád), 
as amended18, that consisted in collecting scent samples, hair samples
15 See supra note 10, p. 522. 
16 J. Musil, Zákaz donucování k sebeobviňování [Ban of compelling self-accusation] (nemo 
tenetur se ipsum accusare)], „Kriminalistika” 2009, No. 4, pp. 252-264.
17 Sbírka zákonů [Law Reports], Česká Republika 2010, No. 151, item 439; See also 
J. Wójcikiewicz, Uzyskiwanie dowodów do badań kryminalistycznych. Glosa do uchwały pełnego 
składu Sądu Konstytucyjnego Republiki Czeskiej z dnia 30 listopada 2010 r. (Pl. ÚS-st 30/10) 
[Gaining evidence for criminological examinations. Comment to the resolution of the Constitutional 
Court of the Czech Republic of 30 November 2010], „Przegląd Sądowy” 2011, No. 11-12, 
pp. 202-205.
18 Sbírka zákonů [Law Reports], Česká Republika 2006, No. 99, item 321. § 114 
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or buccal swabs and whose aim was obtaining objectively available 
evidence for forensic investigations and which did not require the active 
participation of the accused or the suspect, but only the sampling, should 
not be considered as activities by which the accused or suspected person 
would be forced into a self-incrimination that is incompliant with the 
constitution. In order to ensure the participation of the accused or the 
suspect in obtaining such evidence, legal coercive measures may be 
used. The court found in particular that obtaining a hair sample leads 
to cutting a small tuft of hair, and the buccal swab sampling consists in 
rubbing the inside of the oral cavity with a proper sterile spatula; there 
is even no need for a forceful opening of the suspect’s mouth, since it is 
enough to pull the lower lip slightly down and rub its inner side. These 
are non-invasive activities that are pain-free and do not pose any threat 
to the physical and mental health of a person; they are also brief and the 
methodology of these activities has been described in detail in relevant 
police regulations. 
The court rightly stated that the principle of nemo tenetur se ipsum 
accusare is not unlimited and does not guarantee absolute protection to the 
accused. A different interpretation would be contrary to the obligation of 
protecting the public against crime and the principle of fair punishment 
imposed on perpetrators of crimes.
***
In 2011, the co-author of this article (J.W.), in the final part of the 
commentary to the judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech 
Republic wrote that “The Polish Constitutional Tribunal has very rarely 
had an opportunity to issue criminally conditioned decisions19, thus 
maybe in the foreseeable future it will try to issue other decisions?”20. 
(inspection of the body and other similar procedures) imposes on the person the obligation 
to allow blood sampling or the taking of other samples (2), and it also allows the application 
of resistance-relevant direct coercive measures (4). 
19 See J. Wójcikiewicz, V. Kwiatkowska-Wójcikiewicz, Problematyka kryminalistyczna 
w orzecznictwie polskiego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego [Criminological problems in the judgments 
of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal] [in:] Na křižovatkách práva. Pocta Janu Musilovi 
k sedmdesátým narozeninám [On the legal crossroads. Liber amicorum Jan Musil for his 70th 
birthday], Praha: C.H. Beck 2011, pp. 69-78.
20 See supra note 17, p. 205.
Józef Wójcikiewicz, Violetta Kwiatkowska-Wójcikiewicz20   |   Katarzyna Krupa-Lipińska 
 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of vidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
mor probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
th damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
214
The court did, indeed, try as within the subsequent five years it gave two 
judgments relating to reference samples for identification. 
The first judgment, of 5 March 2013, file No U 2/1121, was issued 
after the Ombudsman’s request was considered. The Tribunal stated that 
§ 5 Section 1 of the Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 23 February 
2005 on testing or performing actions involving the accused22 and the 
suspected person 23 is incompliant with Article 74 § 4 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure 24 and Article 92 Section 1, Article 41 Section 1 and 
Article 47 in conjunction with Article 31 Section 3 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland, and § 5 Section 2 is incompliant with Article 74 
Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 92 Section 1 and 
Article 41 Section 1 of the Constitution, similarly as is § 10 Section 1 of 
the regulation, specifically in the fragment including the words “despite 
the use of direct coercive measures”.
Article 74 of the Code of Criminal Procedure says in § 2 and 3 that 
the accused, similarly as a suspected person, is obliged to undergo, in 
particular, the inspection of the body, fingerprinting, blood, and hair 
sampling and sampling of secretions. Collecting buccal swabs by a police 
officer (§ 2 item 3 and § 3) may occur if this is indispensable and there is 
no risk that it would jeopardize the health of the accused or a suspected 
person or other persons25. The Tribunal rightly held that the legislation 
did not explicitly authorize the Minister of Justice in Article 74 § 4 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure to regulate both the issue of direct coercive 
measures during the inspection of the body and taking reference samples
21 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 2013, item 375.
22 According to Art. 71 § 3 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter 
C.C.P.) “the accused” means also “a suspect”.
23 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 2005, No. 33, item 299. The suspected person is a person, in 
regard to whom there is a justified reason of suspecting this person of having committed 
a crime, yet no charges were made against this person (thus it is a person ‘less’ suspected). 
A. M. Tęcza-Paciorek, Pojęcie osoby podejrzanej i jej uprawnienia [The concept of a suspected 
person and his/her rights], „Prokuratura i Prawo” 2011, No. 11, p. 60. 
24 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 1997, No. 89, item 555, with changes. 
25 See also A. Lach, Granice badań oskarżonego w celach dowodowych. Studium w świetle 
reguły nemo se ipsum accusare tenetur i prawa do prywatności [The limits of the investigative 
tests of the accused for evidential purposes. A study in the light of the rule nemo se ipsum accusare 
tenetur and the right to privacy] Toruń: TNOiK 2010, passim.
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as well as the issue of “assistance” in a situation where no provision of the 
Code authorizes the use of direct coercive measures against the accused 
and the suspect. The Tribunal stated that this regulation supplements 
the Code and loses its secondary legislative character, and breaks the 
connection between the regulation and the act (Article 92 (1) of the 
Constitution). From the point of view of other constitutional norms, 
the provisions of the regulation under appeal imposed a limitation on the 
constitutionally protected integrity of the person and personal freedom 
(Article 41 (1) and Article 31 (1) of the Constitution) and the right to 
privacy (Article 47 of the Constitution). 
The said sections of the Regulation of 2005 ceased to be in effect on 
20 March 2013, but the legislature finally regulated by relevant acts the 
problem of direct coercive measures in order to obtain reference samples 
from the suspect, the accused, and the suspected person by adopting 
the amended Act of 27 June 2013 on the Criminal Procedure Code, and 
other acts26, whose Article 1 Section 19 was introduced in Article 74 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure § 3a as follows: “The accused or the suspect 
is called upon to submit to obligations under § 2 and 3. In the event of 
the refusal to comply with these obligations, the accused or the suspect 
may be issued a warrant for detention and compulsory appearance, 
and physical force may be used against them, or technical means of 
overpowering, to the extent necessary for the performance of a given 
activity “. This provision has been in force since 9 November 2013. 
The judgment of 11 October 2016, file No SK 28/15, is the second 
decision on reference sampling. It was taken in the context of the famous 
case of Marek Haslik, a healer from Nowy Sącz, who was accused of 
a crime under Article 18 § 1 in connection with Article 160 § 1 and 2 and 
Article 155 in connection with Article 11 § 2 of the Criminal Code27 and 
of the crime under Article 58 Section 2 of the Act of 5 December 1996 on 
the professions of doctor and dentist 28. Haslik, a “god man” (a driver 
and a storekeeper by profession) used to “heal” people with e.g., goat 
milk and grass from his own garden. He was accused of imposing the 
threat of the loss of life and of manslaughter by making a six-month-old 
26 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 2013, item 1247.
27 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 2016, item 1137.
28 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 2015, item 464.
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girl starve to death; her parents, following his orders, used to feed her 
by giving very small amounts of diluted goat milk every half an hour. 
The healer was convicted in February 2017 with a non-final sentence of 
3.5 years of imprisonment29. The trial at the appellate court is due to start 
on 28 November, 2017. 
A constitutional complaint, on behalf of Marek Haslik, was filed 
by his attorney. She requested for investigation the compatibility of 
Article 74 § 2 Subsection 3 of the Act of 6 June 1997 – the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Journal of Laws No. 89, item 555, as amended, 
with Article 41 (1) (the integrity of the person), Article 47 (the right 
to privacy) and Article 51 (2) in conjunction with Section 3 (right to 
information autonomy) and Article 45 (1) (the right to an impartial and 
independent court), in conjunction with Article 77 (2) of the Constitution, 
and with Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, 
subsequently amended by sixteen Protocols (Journal of Laws of 1993, 
No 61, item 284, as amended).
In this case, with the suspect currently in detention, on 23 October 
2014, the action of sampling biological reference material for genetic 
tests was carried out in the following way. According to the words 
of the accused, he was knocked to the ground and a cotton swab was 
forcefully put into his mouth30. On 21 October 2014, the lawyer was 
informed by fax that on 23 October 2014 her client, still detained in 
prison, would be subject to the procedural action of sampling biological 
reference material for genetic tests. As a result, the lawyer asked the 
prosecutor to suspend this action and postpone to some other date and 
to send information about the circumstances under which the evidence 
was to be taken. On 22 October 2014 the prosecutor, also by fax, sent 
the following information: “Reference sampling for genetic testing is 
a technical activity, does not require any statement to be submitted by 
29 Guru i ludzie, którzy gotowi byliby niemal za niego oddać życie”. Kim jest znachor 
z Nowego Sącza? [„Guru and the people almost ready to give their lives for him”. Who is the quack 
from Nowy Sącz?], available at: http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/znachor-z-
nowgo-sacza [last accessed 20.05.2017]. 
30 Przewrócili i wsadzili patyk do ust [They flipped him to the floor and put a stick into his 
mouth], „Gazeta Wyborcza. Duży Format”, 7 January 2016, p. 7.
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the suspect, and therefore the presence of the lawyer is not necessary”31. 
It appears that the lawyer’s involvement during the swabbing of the 
suspect’s mouth, in this and in other cases, could secure the correctness 
and relevance of the action performed. It would also prevent any real or 
alleged abuse of power as manifested by the police. 
The lawyer filed a complaint against the swabbing, claiming a breach 
of Article 74 § 2 subsection 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure32, i.e., the 
performance of the action, despite the imprecise nature of the condition 
of “necessity” and its non-occurrence in this case, and the lack of any 
connection between the effects of this action and the charges against 
the suspect, as well as the violation of Article 117 § 2 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure in connection with the performance of the actions 
in the absence of the lawyer, who justified and explained the reasons 
for her absence and requested that the action be abandoned within the 
prescribed time limit. The prosecutor’s decision of 17 November 2014 
failed to take account of this complaint.
The Constitutional Tribunal discontinued the proceedings, pursuant 
to Article 40 (1) Subsection 1 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act, regarding 
the examination of compliance with Article 8 of the Convention owing 
to the inadmissibility of the judgment, since international agreements, 
including the Convention itself, cannot constitute a relevant control 
pattern. Moreover, the applicant’s lawyer withdrew the complaint in 
this regard33.
The constitutional problem in the said matter was reduced to the 
question of whether the obligation imposed on the accused under Article 
74 § 2 Subsection 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure consisting in 
allowing a police officer to take a buccal swab, if this is indispensable and 
there is no fear that it would pose a threat to the health of the accused 
or other persons, constitutes a proportionate limitation of the integrity 
of the person (Article 41 (1) of the Constitution), the right to protect
31 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 11 October 2016, file No SK 28/15, sec. 5.
32 Unconstitutionality of Article 74 § 2 subsections 2 and 3 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure was also alleged in the constitutional complaint of 30 December 2011; this 
complaint was not considered by the Constitutional Tribunal due to having been submitted 
with delay (decision of 18 December 2013, Ts 2/12, LEX No 1739530). 
33 See supra note 31, sec. 51.
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private life (Article 47 of the Constitution) and information autonomy 
(Article 51 (2) of the Constitution)34. By referring to the above-mentioned 
control patterns, the Court stated that “integrity of the person can be 
defined as the guaranteed ability of the individual to maintain his or 
her identity and integrity, including the physical one and prohibition of 
any direct external interference that violates this integrity”. The Tribunal 
indicated that integrity of the person “is particularly strongly connected 
with inherent human dignity”. The Tribunal also stressed, pursuant 
to Article 41 Section 1 of the Constitution, “the relationship between 
personal freedom and the integrity of the person,” where freedom – 
“integrity of the person “ is its negative aspect, safeguarding “freedom 
from” intrusion into the inner and outer integrity of every person, 
whereas the concept of “personal freedom” is close in meaning to its 
positive aspect that protects the most widely understood possibility of 
realizing the will and behaviour of the individual”35. 
In a similar view, the Tribunal analyzed the control pattern of 
Article 47 of the Constitution, in accordance with which everyone has 
the right to legal protection of their private life, family life, honour, good 
name, and the taking of decisions on their own personal life, and of 
Article 51 Section 2 of the Constitution, which prohibits public authorities 
to acquire, collect, and make available “information about citizens other 
than it is necessary in a democratic state of law”. The Tribunal aptly 
drew attention to the fact that this regulation “legitimates – which is 
inevitable in any contemporary society – the actions of public authorities 
consisting in acquiring, collecting, and disseminating information about 
individuals in a way other than by submitting such data by the citizen 
him/herself who is obliged to do so under Article 51 Section 1 of the 
Constitution”36. Therefore, the information autonomy resulting from this 
regulation is one of the “components of the right to privacy”37 that is 
derived from Article 47 of the Constitution and includes the right to take 
autonomous decisions on disclosing information about themselves to
34 Ibidem, sec. 82.
35 Ibidem, sec. 66.
36 Ibidem, sec. 75.
37 Ibidem, sec. 76.
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other persons and the right to control this information. The Constitutional 
Tribunal indicated that these rights are not absolute and may be subject 
to restrictions, on the terms and in the manner specified in the Act38. 
In consequence, the Tribunal found that taking buccal swabs samples 
was an interference with the constitutionally protected integrity of the 
person, the right to protect private life, and information autonomy39. For 
these reasons, Article 74 § 2 subsection 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
is to be construed restrictively: indispensability means that evidence 
from DNA analysis must be a prerequisite for the accomplishment of 
objectives of criminal proceedings, i.e., that the perpetrator of the crime 
is to be detected and held criminally liable, and that an innocent person 
is not to be held liable (Article 2 § 1 subsection 1 C.C.P.)40. 
The Tribunal found the applicant’s plea incorrect, stating that 
indispensability as such was insufficient for the proper implementation 
of the requirements resulting from the principle of proportionality, and 
correctly held that, if in the applicant’s case, the action (taking buccal 
swabs samples and a subsequent DNA analysis) under Article 74 § 2 
Subsection 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was performed, although 
it was not indispensable for criminal proceedings, then it would mean 
a case of a wrong practice of applying the law which cannot be recognized 
by the Tribunal by means of a constitutional complaint 41.
In the last paragraphs of the judgment’s grounds, the Tribunal also 
addressed certain more criminalistic than legal aspects of taking buccal 
swabs: the evidence value of DNA analysis, minimal discomfort for the 
person subject to the reference sampling procedure, and limitations of 
tests to only non-coding regions of the genome.
The judgment of the Tribunal stating that Article 74 § 2 Subsection 3 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure is compliant with Article 41 Section 1, 
Article 47 and Article 51 Section 2 in conjunction with Article 31 (3) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is to be considered correct, 
yet certain fragments of the grounds require some comments.
38 Ibidem, sec. 74.
39 Ibidem, sec. 120. 
40 Ibidem, sec. 131, 132. 
41 Ibidem, sec. 134. 
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act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
f evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
mre probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
te “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
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***
There is no separate act on DNA analysis in the Polish legislation. This 
issue is regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Police Act 42, 
and secondary legislation. The Code includes provisions discussed above 
that are used in criminal procedures, whereas the Police Act encompasses 
provisions relating to the DNA database. The only link between these 
instruments is Article 21b subsection 1 of the Police Act: information 
about the results of DNA analysis carried out in connection with criminal 
proceedings shall be entered in the DNA database, which is managed by 
the Police Commander-in-Chief, pursuant to the order of the authority 
conducting pre-trial proceedings or of the court. Thus, a genetic test 
carried out in criminal proceedings does not necessarily need to include 
the defendant’s profile in the database, as the authorized entities are not 
willing to issue relevant regulations. It should be noted that, in theory, 
this profile could be obtained from the person suspected43 of committing 
an indictable offence (Article 20 Section 2a Subsection 1 of the Police 
Act). The legislation, however, gradually narrowed the possibility of 
obtaining DNA material on the one hand by introducing in Article 74 
§ 2 Subsection 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the criterion of 
“indispensability” and, on the other, by passing Article 20 Section 2c - 
this section states that information is not to be collected when it does 
not demonstrate detection, evidence, or identification usefulness in the 
proceedings conducted. As a result, the Polish DNA database included, as 
of 10 October 2017, only 66,197 personal profiles44 (out of over 38 million 
citizens), plus 9,538 profiles of N.N. perpetrators, whereas, for instance, 
the Lithuanian database (Lithuania’s population is close to 3 million) 
included in June 2016 as many as 87,310 personal profiles45. In this context, 
“indispensability” can and should be understood as the need to take 
a swab sample from all “suspected persons” to obtain a DNA profile 
42 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 1990, No 30, item 179 as amended. 
43 See supra note 23.
44 http://clk.policja.pl/clk/baza-danych-dna/dane-statystyczne/109310,Liczba-
profili.html [last accessed 06.11.2017]. 
45 ENFSI survey on DNA Databases in Europe – June 2016, available at: www.enfsi.
eu/documents/other-publications [last accessed 22.05.2017].
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and enter it into the database that, after all, should provide an excellent 
tool for detecting perpetrators of crimes. King’s case is the best example 
here. In Poland, the case of the theft of Claude Monet’s Beach in Pourville 
from the Poznań Museum in 2000 would probably have been unresolved 
until today if the thief’s fingerprints had not been entered into the AFIS 
database in the context of a petty crime; these fingerprints were collected 
in relation to an alimony case46, thus they were not “indispensable” as 
this concept is interpreted by the Constitutional Tribunal.
The Constitutional Tribunal in the above-mentioned judgment 
SK 28/15 explicitly supported the limitation of DNA testing only to 
non-coding regions of the genome. Indeed, the Police Act in Article 20 
Section 2b Subsection 1 does impose such limitation, but it refers only 
to the database context! However, in criminal proceedings, the Central 
Forensic Police Laboratory (rightly) performs phenotypic investigations 
of biological traces of unidentified perpetrators. Yet, no legal regulations 
are in existence with regard to phenotype testing, similarly as it is the case 
of familial searching (although the scarcity of the DNA database in Poland 
seems insufficient for it). Moreover, the principle that “if something is 
not forbidden, it is allowed” does not necessarily have to be used in 
such delicate matter as integrity of the person, protection of privacy, 
or information autonomy. It seems that in this situation Article 138a of 
the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure could be a good starting point 
for the Polish regulations: “DNA testing” shall be understood to mean 
the testing of cellular material which is aimed solely at comparing DNA 
profiles, establishing externally observable personal characteristics of the 
unknown suspect or the unknown victim or establishing consanguinity”47.
46 B. Janiszewski, Monet odnaleziony w szafie [Monet found in a wardrobe], „Newsweek 
Polska” 26.07.2010, available at: www.newsweek.pl/kultura/wiadomosci-kulturalne/
monet-odnaleziony-w-szafie, 62418,1,1.html [last accessed 19.06.2017].
47 www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6533/.../Omsenie/WetboekvanStrafvordering_ENG_
PV.pdf [last accessed 22.05.2017].
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16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
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